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We’re Safer than You Think
Robert Jervis, Columbia University

es of the latter would of course be dreadful, but nothing like the civilization-ending impact of the former.

of us do every day is to cross the street; deaths from
traffic accidents dwarf those from terrorism. The comparison to the Cold War is also telling; although there
is no objective estimate of how likely nuclear war was
then, let alone of how likely nuclear war with Russia
or China is in the foreseeable future, the consequenc-

Unprecedented Security

So why are people saying such foolish things? In
part—but I believe only in small part—people are
consciously exaggerating for bureaucratic, political,
Abstract
or personal reasons. It would hardly behoove the
This article examines terrorism, arguing that the goal head of the intelligence establishment to say someof terrorists is to invoke fear into individuals. The con- thing like: “Although there are no grave dangers to
sequences of terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and American national security, there are a lot of smaller
Paris, among other places, is that the perceptions that problems we need to be aware of and multiple interterrorism is a threat to national security are high. This ests that while less than vital, still require attention.”
work contends that such fears are unwarranted as it Not only budgets but people’s sense of mission are
is more likely that one dies in a traffic accident than entangled with believing that what they do is vital.
a terrorist attack. Delving into the International Rela- During political campaigns (which consume more
tions literature, this article highlights the current de- and more of the electoral cycle) advantage often goes
to a candidate or a party that can claim that the opbates about terrorism and threats to security.
ponents dangerously neglect American security. The
media also has both an interest in playing up danIn the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris and San ger and an outlook that focuses on them. Bad news
Bernardino, fear is on the rise. A December 2015 poll is generally good for circulation, and reporters and
showed 40 percent of the American people saying editors believe that it is their responsibility to keep a
that national security and terrorism were their top sharp eye out for threats to the country.
concern, with job creation and economic growth com- But this does not explain why so many members of
ing in a distant second at 23 percent.1 But even before the general public are fearful. In part, of course, they
these dramatic and disturbing events, political elites are picking up on the cues provided by the elites. This
in the U.S., probably more than mass opinion, were is not all there is to it, however. Although most of the
worried. In 2009, two-thirds of the members of the dangers to our lives come in the form of everyday
Council on Foreign Relations reported believing that activities like driving, people both overestimate the
the world the U.S. faced was more dangerous than it degree of control they have over their lives and are
had been during the Cold War.2 Three years later the more fearful of risks they feel that they cannot conChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin trol. We incorrectly think that we are about-average
Dempsey, claimed, “We are living in the most danger- drivers and that if are careful we can take care of ourous time in my lifetime,”3 and the director of National selves. By contrast, it is next to impossible for any of
Intelligence James Clapper, similarly said, “Looking us to influence the chance of dying in a terrorist atback over my more than a half century in intelligence tack. Furthermore, each terrorist attack gets deeply
I have not experienced a time when we’ve been beset embedded in our memories because they are vivid
by more crises and threats around the globe.”4 Taking and widely covered in the media, and the irony is that
these concerns to heart, on December 22, 2015 the the extensive coverage is due to the fact that they
Dallas symphony cancelled its European tour “due to are so rare. Even traffic accidents that kill significant
the recent and tragic events in Europe and the Unit- numbers of people, such as bad bus accidents, occur
ed States, and based on extensive conversations with frequently enough so that we have come to expect
national and international security professionals.”5
them. The very fact that terrorism is so infrequent
The point of this brief article is that these fears are makes an instance unexpected and therefore more
unwarranted.6 The most dangerous thing I and most impactful.
The greatest threat to national security comes from
war among the major powers, and so our starting
point is that those who are so worried have lost sight
of the fact that the world used to be dangerous beGlobal Security Review | 4

cause these states used to fight each other with some
regularity. By contrast, currently the leading powers—
the U.S., the states that form the EU, and Japan—form
a security community.7 According to Karl Deutsch, a
security community is a group of countries who not
only are at peace, but among whom war is unthinkable.8 This is a very restricted category. Even countries
who remain at peace with each other for prolonged
periods often think about and plan for war with one
another. It is exceedingly rare for major states to fail
to do so, and when they have put the thought of war
between them out of their minds, the reason often is
the pressing threat from a common enemy. Indeed,
it was the perception of a common threat from the
USSR that was partly responsible for the rise of the security community, but that country’s demise has not
led to the community’s demise.
The importance of this break with the past hardly can
be exaggerated: it is not an exaggeration to say that
the history of world politics has been dominated by
war and the shadow of war among the most powerful
states. My definition of leading powers excludes Russia and the PRC, and a skeptic might argue that it was
designed with that purpose in mind. Nevertheless,
even if a war involving these two countries remains
possible, one reason why these possibilities receive
as much attention as they do is the lack of greater
dangers. Furthermore, when we look at the possible
causes of a war between NATO and Russia or the U.S.
(and/or Japan) and China we see that, despite some
overheated rhetoric growing out of conflicts over
Ukraine and the East and South China seas, the issues
are not direct and vital to the U.S. That is, only those
with overheated imaginations can envision Russia as
a military threat to Europe, and the danger to the U.S.
arising from China’s rise is indirect only, stemming as
it does from the maintenance of America’s Cold War
alliances in East Asia.
China does indeed challenge the U.S. dominance in
East Asia, but even leaving aside the pacifying effects
of nuclear weapons and high levels of economic interdependence, the U.S. has room to accommodate
the rising power and the level of threat is much lower than that which characterized much of IR in the
past. The same is true for the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, another issue high on the American agenda. Even those who reject the argument that proliferation will be stabilizing have difficulty estimating the
magnitude of the danger, and therefore the level of
effort and resources that should be arrayed against it.

Although rank-ordering these and other threats is difficult, more difficult still is putting them on some absolute scale. The result, I believe, is that the American
leadership if not the mass public has lost its sense of
proportion in the international dangers being posed,
and concomitantly has failed to see how much safer
we are now.
In other words, the leading powers now have an unprecedented degree of security, or at least security
against threats from other countries (I am leaving
aside the dangers of climate change and other menaces from nature even if we can trace them to human
activities), and the result is to give greater salience to
minor threats like terrorism.
Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history.” Understood—or rather misunderstood—as the
claim that history and conflict had come to an end,
this is clearly incorrect. But this is not what Fukuyama
argued. His claim is that we have seen the end of
clashing ideologies that purport to be universally
valid and that, as such, seek to spread themselves
throughout the world.9 There is much to this. While
the ideology of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism,
far from converting everyone, has spurred a backlash,
there is no other general contender such as fascism or
communism. Islamic fundamentalism (the term is imprecise if not misleading, but there is no other one in
widespread use) rejects and seeks to exclude Western
liberalism, but in no realistic sense aspires to spread
its truth to the entire world. The PRC has also followed
its own path, and the combination of some degree
of economic liberalization coupled with authoritarian
rule and enriching the leaders has produced dramatic
results. But China has not touted this as a model for
others to follow, its success may depend on factors
particularly Chinese, and others have not flocked to
approach.
As Arnold Wolfers explains, when states have met
their needs for security and autonomy, they often
turn toward what he called “milieu goals”10 which
arise from non-material motives. For the West today,
this means democracy, human rights, and limits on if
not the elimination of corruption. These embody the
way of life in the West, or, to be more precise, the way
the West likes to see itself. The argument for spreading these values and ways of behaving is partly that
they will enhance international cooperation and so
be in the interests of the West, but at least as important is that they will benefit the societies that adopt
them. Whether or not this is the case is fortunately
Global Security Review | 5

beyond my scope here; all that is relevant is the claim ical agents or nuclear weapons (a “dirty bomb” that
that milieu goals are increasingly important in world would use conventional explosives to spread radiopolitics.
active material is a borderline case). To estimate the
probability that terrorists could obtain such weapons
One large open question is the extent to which the
is subject to dispute and beyond my expertise.12 But
West, and especially the U.S., will seek to impose its we should note that even if terrorists could steal or
values on others by force, a question which is relat- make such weapons, they would also have to bring
ed to whether its leaders believe that countries with them to an American or a European city, a feat that
different social systems are a threat to it. The obvious makes the Paris attack seem like child’s play in comexample is the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime parison. The danger cannot be dismissed, of course,
in Iraq in 2003, which I believe can be traced in large and one irony is that fear as reflected in government
part to the fact that President George W. Bush held policy may be a self-denying prophecy. Because govwhat Kenneth Waltz called a “second image” theory of ernment officials are themselves deeply worried, or
the causes of international conflict11 in believing that feel that they have to appease the public by acting
the fundamental source of a state’s foreign policy was
on fears they do not believe, they may take extraordithe nature of its domestic regime, and therefore that
nary precautions that greatly reduce the danger. In a
a regime like Iraq’s that ruled its own people by force
further twist, to produce the sustained spending and
would inevitably behave in a parallel fashion internapublic mobilization needed to continue these politionally. The sad results of the war have dampened
cies, officials may fan public fears (think of the “if you
the enthusiasm for such enterprises and weakened
see something, say something” campaign).
the hold of the theory behind it, but whether this is a
permanent or only a temporary development is yet to It is of course hard for the public—and even for exbe determined. Even if this war and the overthrow of perts—to estimate the likelihood of large-scale terQaddafi did not make us less safe, they were not the rorist attacks. What evidence would be relevant to
product of real security threats that have historically this task? If we hear that a plot has been foiled should
played such a large role in international politics.
we raise our estimate because it shows how active
terrorists are or lower because it shows the success of
Terrorism
vigilance and defensive measures?
Whether or not America’s previous adventures have
On balance, I find it hard to see how terrorism is one
led to the current bout of terrorism, my previous analof the major scourges of contemporary life. But many
ysis does not address the validity of current fears. My
people take it as such, and indeed that is the whole
claim that they are vastly exaggerated is quite simpoint of terrorists. If they had sources of effective
ple. The extent of a threat depends on the probabilpower, they would use it to overthrow the governity that it will materialize multiplied by the damage
ments they despise, alter the societies they find loathincurred if it does. The last factor is crucial. As horrisome, and establish their values as supreme. They
ble as they were, the recent attacks in Paris and San
cannot do this, and instead the goal of terrorism is to
Bernardino and the downing of the Russian airliner
terrorize—to induce fear and expectation that much
over Sinai killed relatively few people. Of course this
greater harm will follow. I do not think it will, but the
is no solace to the relatives of those who died, and evfrightened and frightening expectations themselves
ery individual death is a tragedy that affects a wider
are not without their consequences.
circle of people, but in the cold-blooded calculus of
national security these numbers are tiny and pale not
only in comparison to previous wars, but also when
compared to everyday threats as noted at the start of
this essay.
A rebuttal is that the past does not always predict the
future, and the fact that terrorist attacks have so far
killed only small numbers does not mean that this
pattern will continue to hold true. Of course this is
right, but it is crucial to realize that terrorists can kill
massive numbers only if they use infectious biolog-
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